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WHEN IS A POLITICAL QUESTION JUSTICIABLE?
By IVAN C. RUTLEDGE*
Thompson v. Talmadge' may go down in state history as the final
scene of an opera bouffe situation, written with dignity and judicial
courage by the present incumbents of the Highest Bench. On the
other hand, if the stripe of historian known as a debunker becomes
popular again, as in the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era, it may be
expected that the judicial cause celebre of this year in Georgia will
be characterized as the political coup which was decisive because of
the superstitious reverence of the populace for the judiciary.
The political question doctrine is frequently enmeshed with other
doctrines in the judicial mind. Probably its nearest relative is the
doctrine of the separation of powers, which teaches in its most ex-
treme and absurd form that the legislature alone must only legislate,
the judiciary alone must only adjudicate, and the executive alone must
only execute.' The political question doctrine then becomes: the politi-
cal branches must determine policy and decide political questions, but
the judiciary, not being a political branch, must not decide political
questions.3 Another related doctrine is that of the independence and
autonomy of the three branches of government. It teaches that neither
branch of the government is subject to control by another branch
but each has supreme governmental power within its own sphere.4
Of course where matters of constitutional right are involved this
doctrine vanishes and the judiciary are supreme, as final expounders
of the constitution, which is theoretically supreme.' Indeed the Con-
stitution of Georgia expressly confers upon the judiciary such power
over "legislative acts."6 Supposing, then, that a question is at once
political and constitutional, the theories are at odds with each other.
Therefore, when a court refuses to decide a question on the ground
that it is political it discovers a limitation on the doctrine of judicial
review. In short it may be said that a political question is not justi-
ciable when its subject matter is of such a nature that the general rule
of judicial review is inapplicable.
It should be pointed out that other obstacles of justiciability exist,
such as lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter7 or parties,8 or the
*Professor, Mercer University Law School.
1. Thompson v. Talmadge, 41 S.E. 2d 883.
2. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
3. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698 (1893).
4. Merrill v. Sherburne, 1. N.H. 199 (1818).
5. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
6. Art. I, See. IV. Par. II.
7. Marbury v. Madison, supra note 5.
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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fact that the controversy is not presented in a form traditional for
adjudication by a court or a form prescribed by the legislature,9 or
the lack of interested parties," or the lack of a real controversy."
It should also be made dear that the existence of a political question
in a controversy does not ipso facto deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion over the case. Its presence may simply conclude some of the
issues in the case.2
The federal courts have refused to decide certain questions on the
ground that they are political in the sense that they turn on relation-
ships arising from the federal union of the United States, such as:
interstate rendition; I  the guaranty of a republican form of goVern-
ment;4 and the political status of a state." Other examples are to
be found in questions which impinge upon the conduct of foreign
affairs, such as validity of acts of foreign governments, 6 determina-
nation of the sovereignty to which a territory belongs," or the date
a war began.'" In the state courts typical questions held not meet
for determination arise from claims of irregularity in the process of
policy formation by the people of the state or their agents. For
example, an attack may be made upon a statute on the ground that
it was not enacted according to procedures prescribed by the con-
stitution 9 or that the legislature which purported to enact it was
not properly constituted.Y
What basis can be derived from these cases of judicial self-limita-
tion which will serve as an explanatory generalization or principle?
It has been suggested that the unreliability of evidence,2' or the lack
of rules of law,' or judicial fear of the consequences of adjudica-
tion23 are reasons. On the other hand it has been pointed out that
expediency or judicial timorousness are not only unsatisfactory as
principles of law but are inaccurate. 4 Undoubtedly the vagueness
of the contours of the problem provides the judiciary with a con-
venient bomb shelter. Be that as it may, a new formulation is here-
with proposed. The business of a court is primarily the determina-
tion of private rights and the extent of individual interests under
the law. By "the law" is meant in this connection the extent to which
9. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1932).
10. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
11. Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
12. Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863).
13. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1860).
14. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon. 223 U. S. 118 (1912).
15. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (1868).
16. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918).
17. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415 (1839).
18. The Protector, 12 Wall, 700 (1871).
19. MacFeeley v. Williams, 186 Ga. 145 (1938).
20. Macon & Augusta R. Co. v. Little, 45 Ga. 370 (1872).
21. IV Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 699, Sec. 1350.
22. Field. "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485 (1924).
23. Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338 (1924).
24. Weston, "Political Questions," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1924).
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the organs of the state have provided that a given interest which
comes before the court in a concrete case shall be recognized by
the officials of the state. If there are any doubts as to this "extent
of recognition" there are questions of law. If there are any doubts
as to the quality or quantum of the "interest" there are questions of
fact. In courts of law the resolution of these questions in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition is to be made on the basis of a reasoned morality 5
as applied to the fact situation in which the parties before the court
are found. On the other hand the judicial forum is not the only
governmental organ for the determination of issues in which the
state is interested. Other forums that might be suggested are the
legislature, the ballot box, and the councils of the executive branch.
These agencies are called political. The basis for decision in these
precincts is now one consideration and now another. It may be
morality, or the forces of adjustment of competing groups, or expedi-
ency. At bottom it is a matter of power, expressing itself through
public opinion and in part through force or the threat of force,
especially in foreign affairs. What would be irrelevant in a court of
law here becomes at times controlling. Information that would not
be available to a court of law for the very reason that the value of
the information would be lost by making it public does not have to
be made public in a political forum. Decisions can be based on secret
reasons or facts known only to the representative of the public. A
political decision connotes an exercise of the will in the interest of
the decider or his principal; a judicial decision connotes an exercise
of the faculty of reason appealing to standards of right and wrong
in the ethical sense. A judge decides as between the parties to the
litigation; a political decision may be made on the basis of conserving
or advancing the power of a person or group-which may be in-
determinate and inarticulate-on whose behalf the decision is made.
Consequently the rationalization of judicial self-limitation is fre-
quently made with the separation of powers as the starting point,
supplemented by the doctrine of the independence of the departments
of government, the presumption of regularity of official action, 8 the
rule that mandamus will not lie to control official discretion," the
construction of constitutional provisions as directory rather than
mandatory,2" the doctrine that equity will not interfere with elec-
tions,29 and the refusal to consider the constitutionality of an act
long acquiesced in when affairs of state have been carried on under it."
The line of demarcation outlined above is most clearly demon-
25. See Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pt. III," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1923).
26. U. S. v. Fletcher, 148 U. S. 84 (1893).
27. Work v. U. S. ex rel. Rives, 267 U. S. 175 (1925).
28. Fergus v. Marks, 321 111. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
29. Colegrove v. Green ............. U. S .............. 90 L. Ed. 1242 (1946).
30. State ex rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 546, 159 Pao. 777, 779 (1916).
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strated in a situation which presents a logical difficulty which cannot
be surmounted. This situation occurs when a revolution has taken
place. Obviously a court which survived the revolution or one newly
created cannot be asked to adjudicate that the revolution has, or
has not taken place because the Wrong decision would. involve a
necessary determination that the court is not a court, wherefore it
cannot decide wrongly and only one conclusion is possible, the one
which affirms the existence of the court. Whether the current regime
should command the continued loyalty of the people is beside the
point as a legal question, whatever its merits as a moral or political
proposition.3
Coming now to the Georgia case which has focussed the attention
of the bar on this area of constitutional law it clearly may be affirmed
that whether an individual is or is not the governor of a state is
not analogous to the situation outlined above. A change in the in-
cumbency of an office, even that of chief magistrate of a constitu-
tional government does not raise the question of the legitimacy of
the governmental regime." Its residuum of power analogous to that
of the English Crown, if anywhere in an organ of government with
separation of powers, is in the legislature, to the extent that it has
been formally conferred by the people."
On the other hand, courts are sometimes faced with questions of
private right which turn on issues that would be non-justiciable if
they had been previously determined by the political branch. In such
a case they make an independent determination based on considera-
tions traditionally employed by courts of law, as for example in
foreign affairs the principles of international law rather than, say,
the advantage of the sovereign, are employed to decide the issue."4
Public office, however, even the highest office, is not strictly speak-
ing a typical subject of a claim of private right. "That a public office
is the property of him to whom the execution of its duties is in-
trusted is repugnant to the institutions of our country . . . Public
officers are ...but the agents of the body politic . . .,"" In Taylor
and Marshall v. Beckham"0 all the Justices except Mr. Justice Harlan
agreed that Whatever right a claimant to, as distinguished from a
rightful incumbent of an office has must be measured by the means
provided for ascertaining the fact of his election or appointment to
31. Cf. Weston, op. cit., at pp. 302-304, where he discusses The Duke of York's Claim to the
Crown (1460).
32. Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849).
33. See I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 173-179. With Macon & Augusta R.
Co. v. Little, supra n. 21, compare Prince v. Skillin, 71 Maine 361 (1880), the former hold-
ing that the legality of a legislative session is not open to judicial question, the latter that
the courts must recognize one or the other of two legislatures each claiming legitimacy.
34. Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalI. 199 (1796). See the opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell at p. 261.
35. Quoted frof State ex rel. Savannah v. Dews in Walton v. Davis, 188 Ga. 56, 58 (1939).
36. 178 U. S. 548 (1900).
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the office. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that the question
of who has acceded to public office is at best a matter of private
right only to the extent that ascertainment of that fact is committed
by law to the courts. It follows then that questions which might be
non-justiciable because of their political character may be made justi-
ciable by a process of political self-limitation comparable to judicial
self-limitation. Indeed one of the mainstays of progress in creating
an orderly civilization is the ability of society to remove matters
from the policy area to the area of the rule of law. A single example
of this process will suffice to point up the discussion: Boundary
disputes between states are justiciable under Article III of the Con-
stitution of the United States," but the same question would seem
to be non-justiciably political insofar as the tribunals of the states
affected are concerned.'
In what sense may the question of who is the rightful incumbent
of an elective office be said to be political? Viewed from the stand-
point of the public interest in the question the matter is political
both in the sense of partisan politics39 and in the broader meaning
that the selection of one individual as opposed to another is an
expression of the will of the electorate as to what kind of policies
are desired. To this extent the question is quite comparable to the
question of the validity of a statute when challenged on the ground
of non-compliance with procedural provisions in a constitution. To
this extent also, the determination of which of two contenders is suc-
cessful is a determination of policy in its effect, no matter how judi-
cial the court may be, or how much traditional legal materials are
used in reaching the determination. This viewpoint is recognized in
the provisions of Art. V, Sec. I, Par. IV of the Georga Constitution
which commit the matter of election of a governor to the legislature
at least when no majority is voted in the general election. It is also
apparent in the provisions for contested elections if not in the pro-
visions for canvassing the votes, neither of which is directly com-
mitted to a court.40 At least insofar as quo warranto is concerned
the legislature has prohibited its use to test the right of a person to
occupy the office of governor."
37. New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284 (1831).
38. Bedel v. Loomis, 11 N. H. 2 (1840).
39. Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1946), appeal dismissed, 67 S. Ct.
21 (1946), rehearing denied 67 S. Ct. 296 (1946).
40. Art. V, Sec. I. Par. III-V, Sec. II, Par. 1. It may be questioned whether "legislative acts"
which the judiciary shall declare void (supra n. 6) include the election of a governor or
other actions which are not acts of legislation. Cf. Cooley, loc. cit. supra n. 34, for the
proposition that a state legislature has the general power of governing consistent with power
to adjudicate in the courts and power to execute the laws in the executive branch, and sub-
ject to express constitutional limitations or deprivations of private right inconsistent with
free government or natural justice.
41. Georgia Code, 1933, Secs. 64-208, 64-209. But the Georgia Declaratory Judgments Act, Ga.
Laws, 1945 p. 137 seems to have the effect of reopening the question by another route under
the recent decision unless that case be regarded not as a test of title to the office but under
the doubtful category of judicial assistance to preserve executive authority. Cf. U. S. v.
Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (Cir. Ct. N. D. I1. 1894).
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Under the present state of the law of the Constitution of Georgia
not only are acts of the General Assembly violative of express con-
stitutional limitations void and subject to judicial review, but any ac-
tion of the General Assembly not a matter of internal procedure
would seem to be subject to judicial inspection to determine whether
there was power to act. That is to say, limitations upon its power
which may be judicially enforced include not only express constitu-
tional limitations but restrictions arising from a judicial determina-
tion that there is no constitutional warrant for the action. The Court
held that it had before it the fundamental question of whether the
legislative decision to proceed to elect a governor was within consti-
tutional limits of legislative power, and that determination of such
a question is within the prerogatives of the judiciary. It held that
title to the office is a matter of private right which raises the ques-
tion of whether the legislative act of election is contrary to the Con-
stitution. Based on the contentions of counsel, the Court expressly
determined the question on the same basis as if the former incum-
bent had not resigned, so that the "right" involved was that of the
prior incumbent. In addition, public interest in having a decision was
mentioned as an additional reason for adjudication. The Court did
not decide that the election was an infringement of the powers of the
executive or judicial branches; but it emphatically held that it was
the exercise of a power not conferred upon it by the Constitution and
therefore was an infringement of the power residing in the people, in
short, an act of usurpation.
As to the precise question involved, the General Assembly can elect
a governor when and only when no person receives a majority of the
votes cast in the general election. On the other hand it appears that
if the majority vote were cast at successive elections for persons who
because of death, or possibly ineligibility, could not be seated, the
prior incumbent could even attain life tenure as governor. It would
seem that only a constitutional amendment could alter this situation
and that the prior incumbent has a constitutional right to have the
courts protect his incumbency. Consequently a statute withdrawing
the question from the courts similar to the statute prohibiting the use
of quo warranto would be unconstitutional. Of course the possibility
of a governor with life tenure can' be dismissed as too slight to be
considered, as well as the temptation to friends of the incumbent to
assassinate the governor-elect, but the continued decline of the prestige
of legislative bodies must give pause. Is the art of popular govern-
ment so much in eclipse that representatives elected to the highest
deliberative assembly cannot be trusted to stay within the bounds of
their power?
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Whether in a given circumstance the political power has limited
itself and committed a question to judicial determination may be
clear by virtue of a constitutional or statutory provision. On the other
hand, if the meaning of the provision itself is not clear, the question
of whether such renunciation of power to act politically has taken
place will itself have a political flavor in the sense that its determina-
tion is based upon the desires and preferences of the public. In the
case of Thompson v. Talmadge the relative lack of political disturb-
ance resulting from the decision may be regarded at least as confirma-
tion of the accuracy of the political judgment of the majority of the
Court in deciding to adjudicate and at most as a correct legal deter-
mination that the people intended that the action of the General As-
sembly should be subject to review by the judiciary. The very exist-
ence of popular uncertainty as to the effect of the legislative election
is some slight token42 that under the circumstances the question al-
though political was in the popular mind justifiable. If the succession
of the lieutenant-governor is left out of the discussion, the tendency
of the decision is on the one hand favorable to popular election but
on the other contrary to political change. This tendency is in accord
with the new Constitution, which lengthens gubernatorial terms43 and
provides for a popularly elected successor in case of vacancy in the
office.44
There are two external checks upon a court which undertakes ad-
judication of a political question which has not been committed to the
courts. One of them is political action within the area of legality: the
enactment of restrictive constitutional or statutory provisions. The
other is extra-legal political action: the refusal of the other branches
of government or the people to carry out the mandate of the court. If
the latter occurs the result is the unpleasant necessity of drawing a
conclusion that either the court or the political organ violated the
law.4' Such considerations may at times stimulate judicial self-limita-
tion in the interest of the dignity of the courts and over the long run
in the interest of the integrity of the rule of law.
There is no inherent improbability in a situation where the legis-
lature decides contested" and plurality47 elections but the courts decide
what happens when the governor-elect dies. On the other hand it is
42. It would be difficult to judge the relative proportions of popular uncertainty, and dissatis-
faction with the result on the part of the political opposition. Compare the discussion of this
phenomenon under the heading of estoppel in Turman v. Duckworth, supra n. 40.
43. Constitution of Georgia, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I.
44. Ibid., Par. VII.
45. Cf. Ex parte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9, 487 (Cir. Ct. D. Md. 1861).
46. Constitution of Georgia, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. V.
47. Ibid., Par. IV. The language of the paragraph concludes: ... and in all cases of election
of a Governor by the General Assembly, a majority of the members present shall be neces-
sary to a choice," rather than: ... and in such case, a majority of the members prment
shall be necessary to a choice."
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doubtful that this situation is ineluctably dictated by the Constitution
of Georgia.
FOR SALE: The following books belonging to the late C. B.
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Georgia Laws-Most of them from 1870 to 1941
Park's Code of Ga.-Several Volumes
Ga. House Journal-Several Volumes
Ga. Senate Journal-Several Volumes
Extra books such as Loveland on Bankruptcy, Wills and Admin-
istrations of Estates by Redfearn, Powell on Land Registration and
Actions for Land.
For Information Write:
MRS. W. F. BRUNSON
Reynolds, Georgia
The Bankers Health and Life
Insurance Company
P. L. Hay, President
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A year ago we published the following
message. We thought it was true then, and
we think it is more true now-so much so
that we repeat:
Germany and Italy undertook to trade
political liberty for personal security. In so
doing they lost both.
Our Country can learn that this exchange
is never possible. The Bar can and will do
more than any other group to help preserve
that liberty, which is our most precious pos-
session.
Home Office
Bankers Insurance Building
Macon, Georgia.
